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New CFC Report on Assessing Risk in PE Investment in China

January 25th, 2010 No comments

China First Capital Report on Assessing Risk in PE Investment in China

“Risk and Reward.  They are the yin and yang of investing.”

So begins the latest of CFC’s Chinese-language research reports on risk and reward in private equity investment in China. The 18-page report (titled 风险与回报 in Chinese)  has just been published, and is downloadable via the CFC website by clicking this link:  http://www.chinafirstcapital.com/Riskandreward.pdf

The report’s goal, as stated in the introduction, is to “summarize the ways PE firms evaluate the risks of an investment opportunity so that entrepreneurs will better understand the decision-making process of PE firms, and so greatly improve the odds of succeeding in raising PE capital.” 

The report identifies five key areas of risk that private equity investors attempt to quantify, manage and where possible, mitigate: They are:

  1. 1.      Market Risk
  2. 2.      Execution Risk
  3. 3.      Technology Risk
  4. 4.      Political Risk 
  5. 5.      Due Diligence Risk

As far as we know, this is the first such detailed report prepared in Chinese, specifically for Chinese entrepreneurs. It was written with input from the entire CFC team, and represents a collation of our experiences in dealing both with the founders and owners of Chinese SME and the PE firms that invest in them. 

Few, if any, Chinese entrepreneurs have experience raising private equity capital, or for that matter, answering pointed questions about their business. So, the whole PE process will often seem to them to be odd and protracted. The report aims to increase entrepreneurs’ level of understanding ahead of any PE fund-raising process. The report puts it this way: 

“ The goal of PE firms is to lower risk when they invest, not completely eliminate it. Risk is a necessary part of any profit-making activity. The basic principle of all PE investing is finding the best “risk-adjusted return” – which means, the best ratio of risk to potential future profit.”

Some strategies for entrepreneurs to lower an investor’s risk are also discussed. It’s practically impossible to fully eliminate these risks. But, an entrepreneur will have an important ally in managing them, if successful in raising PE capital. 

PE investment in China is a process in which an entrepreneur give up sole proprietorship over the risks in his business. It’s a new concept for most of them. But, the results are almost always positive. A problem shared is a problem halved. 

We hope the report contributes to the continued growth and success of the PE industry in China.

It can also be enjoyed, for entirely other reasons, by anyone who shares my love of Song Dynasty porcelains. Some beautiful examples of Jun, Guan, Ge, Yaozhou, Cizhou and Longquan ceramics are used as illustrations. 

Some examples:

Yaozhou4
Jun4

Guan6

 

 

 

 

 


Private Equity Firms in China in the Firing Line – Ratcheting Up the Criticism of Performance Ratchets

April 3rd, 2009 No comments

Ming Dynasty Cloisonne

In an interesting discussion this week in Shenzhen with a very smart and capable lawyer (Ke Luo of Fangda Partners), I learned about a small, but growing backlash against the Top Tier private equity firms working China. Evidently there have been some articles in the Chinese press voicing criticisms of their approach and methods, and comparing them unfavorably with Chinese domestic investment companies. 

Upfront disclosure: we choose to work only with the 70 or so Top Tier private equity firms active in China, as we believe they are the best investors for companies with the greatest potential, adding more value, beyond just capital, than any other source of investment. 

A main point of contention: the ratchet and performance provisions of most of the top private equity investment deals in China (and everywhere else in the world). These are the provisions, incorporated into the final closing share purchase agreement, through which the PE firm gains greater ownership in a company they’ve invested in if the company fails to meet previously agreed revenue, profit or margin targets.   

It’s a penalty for underperformance. And a very effective and focusing one. It’s not uncommon for these ratchets provisions to specify that the PE firm can gain an additional 10-15% ownership, at no additional cost,  in a company that fails to meet the annual targets. 

In good economic times and in solidly-run companies, ratchet provisions are very rarely put into effect. So, they are a generally just a ghoulish contingent presence in every PE investment contract, the stick that compliments the carrot of a PE firm investing in your business. I know from personal experience that the concept can seem very off-putting – even frightening – to some Chinese bosses: that the PE firm will, for example, go from owning 25% of his company to 40% of his company if the owner has one year that falls below the projected levels of profit and revenue. 

We’re not in good economic times at the moment, so it’s a certainty that more ratchet provisions will be triggered this year. This is what is behind some of the complaining in the Chinese press about international PE firms. Chinese investment firms apparently don’t often include ratchet provisions. The implication of the articles is that a Chinese company is better off taking money from a Chinese investment company, and so free itself from the possibility of a sort of “takeover by stealth”, as the PE firm’s ownership ratchets upward with each year of under-target performance. 

On the surface, ratchet provisions are a very fat, very easy target. So, no surprise some in the Chinese press are attacking them. But, it’s a very incomplete, unfair – and even financially illiterate – criticism to say that because of performance ratchet provisions, a Chinese company is better off taking money from a Chinese investment company. 

Chinese investment firms may not use performance ratchets, but they have a variety of other serious weaknesses. Believe me, I’m no fan of ratchets of any kind, and work hard in negotiations with PE firms to eliminate their potential for causing harm to our clients’ businesses.  But, I still think, in almost all cases, a good Chinese private company is far better off taking money from a reputable PE firm than from a more loosely-run Chinese investment business. 

The reasons are many. But, the most deep-seated are based on an appreciation of what an outside investor can and should provide a strong Chinese SME company besides just capital. Money, famously, all spends the same. So, taking $10mn from a rich uncle or from a leading private equity firm is no different, in terms of what the money can buy – a new factory perhaps, or expanded marketing and sales, or an acquisition. 

The key difference is that the best PE firms are going to do a lot more than just write a check and then wait for the riches to flow three years later at IPO. They are going to get deeply involved assisting the company to improve all areas of its operations, implementing best practices in areas like financial accounting and corporate governance, as well as providing real expertise on hard core sales and operational issues. They also know, from past successful experience, how best to guide a private company towards a successful IPO, whether on China’s domestic stock market, or abroad.

A Chinese investment company, from what I can gather, does not have the experience, the management talent – or even the inclination – to be involved in such a detailed fashion with the companies it invests in. 

I believe, based on my own practical experience,  that the good PE firms often really do make a significant difference inside a company, enabling it to get further faster than it otherwise would. Of course, PE firms can be a pain to work with. This goes way beyond the potential for a ratchet provision to be triggered. The good PE firms act as fiduciaries for their Limited Partners, and so require a massive amount of due diligence before investing, and no less enormous information flows (generally on financial performance) after an investment is made. They want quarterly board meetings, and often hold veto rights on any spending above $500,000 or so. 

But, in return, the PE firm will go to the furthest limits of its collective abilities to make sure the Chinese company succeeds above and beyond even what the boss of that company could expect. A domestic Chinese investment company? Most likely, they have had little experience with leading good companies toward successful IPOs, little operational knowledge, little desire to commit so thoroughly to adding value inside a company. 

So, yes, performance ratchet provisions are nasty. However, they should never come into effect – if the company and the PE firm are doing everything in their power to keep the business growing. The PE firms, contrary to the way it may appear, do not  want performance ratchets triggered any more than the company’s owner does. It’s also going to reflect badly on the PE firm’s judgment and abilities, and so make it harder for them to continue to raise money for future investment.

In other words, every time a performance ratchet is triggered, it gets harder for that PE firm to continue to thrive. They would rather own a smaller share of a solid company that’s meeting its targets, than a bigger share of one that isn’t.

 

Valuations head down in Chinese Private Equity — but too low is as bad as too high

December 16th, 2008 No comments

How much is an asset worth? When the asset is a Private Equity stake in a high-growth private Chinese company, it’s as much a question of timing and sentiment, as underlying value. 

It’s clear as 2008 ends that the steep falls in world stock markets this year are causing a general reappraisal of valuation multiples in PE deals in China. This is logical, and inevitable. 

It’s logical, because entry and exit multiples can’t be completely decoupled. When share markets fall, so do price-equity multiples for most public companies. Their unquoted peers should track downward also.

The element of inevitability is that in many instances, the multiples on some PE investments in China had reached unsustainably high levels. How high? That depends who you ask. To me, if the multiple exceeds ten times trailing earnings, for a company in anything but exceptional cases in the high-tech or healthcare sectors,  the price is too high. 

PE firms chased valuations up. Now, they are chasing them down.

As recently as this spring, there were still investments being made in China at multiples of 12 times or higher. It’s hard to imagine those same deals being done now at anything like that price. 

Usually, the high multiples were the outcome of a bidding war, where several PE firms were competing for the chance to invest in a Chinese company. I’m all in favor of this, that PE firms should compete for good opportunities. Like any competitive bidding process, it results in a fairer price to the seller. 

That’s a primary responsibility we have at China First Capital, to get our clients the highest valuation from the most suitable potential investor. Both are important: price and the firm doing the investing.                    

But, while a competitive market is a good thing, the high-altitude double-digit valuations are not. They create, at the very least, additional and unwanted pressure, post-investment, on companies to pursue growth at all costs. This is the only way a PE firm could hope to make a decent return. 

The more malign effect, in my view, is that they give false signals to the market: specifically, they can create valuation expectations among other laoban that are unrealistic and unattainable. This can then delay or even eliminate the possibility of these firms raising the PE funding they will need. That is in no one’s interest.

I met this past week with a couple of very smart, seasoned PE investors in Shanghai. All are expecting a more active period of investing ahead as the New Year begins, after several months of greatly reduced deal flow. They are also, of course, expecting lower valuations than were the case earlier this year.

As we all know, markets have a tendency to overshoot. I sense, perhaps, that the PEs are looking now for valuations that are as unrealistically low as they were unrealistically high just a few months back. 

This is a problem almost as severe as overly-high valuation expectations among companies. Low ball valuations (by which I mean low to mid- single digits) are only going to appeal to companies that have no other financing options, or who foresee problems ahead in their business – problems they will try to keep hidden from a potential PE investor. In other words, a company that would take money at three times last year’s earnings is probably one best left to its own devices. 

Infinite Opportunities ÷ Finite Capital

September 7th, 2008 No comments

To a hammer, every problem is a nail. Equally, to many fine entrepreneurs, seeing abundant opportunities for profit, the only problem is capital. Not markets. Or competition. Or industry cycles. 

In other words, good entrepreneurs usually plan big, to build big new businesses that will generate huge returns. That’s great. The only limiting factor they perceive is access to adequate capital to build big enough and fast enough to earn the largest potential return. The problem here, as we say in America, is that such an approach can be “assbackward”. Companies usually need to adjust their plans to the capital they can raise — not decouple the two entirely. 

We had a series of meetings this week with Chinese companies interested in working together with China First Capital to secure private equity funding. These meetings are usually long, detailed, and for the most part, highly enjoyable. We’re lucky to have so many outstanding companies approach China First Capital. They come from a very wide range of industries. For example, this past week, we met with one business in the high-tech synthetic fiber industry, and another that owns a large-scale sugar refinery. 

I’ve learned, over many years, first as a Forbes Magazine reporter and then as a venture capitalist, how to form a quick (and one hopes, accurate) assessment of a business’s potential. With both of these companies, the assessment is very positive. In both cases, though, the laoban clearly hadn’t thought very deeply about how much capital they both should and could raise. There was, at least at the start, this disconnect between the size of their plans, and their ability to finance them with equity capital. 

So, we needed quite a bit of time to explain things. Opportunities in business are infinite, but capital is finite resource. Investors want to achieve the highest risk-adjusted return possible. But, equally, they will determine how much capital to invest not purely, or even primarily, based on the potential return. They will also give strong consideration to issues of corporate control, valuation, ROI, even asset coverage. 

So, while investors will applaud a company with a solid plan to build a new division with annual profits of over $25mn within three years, they won’t be rushing to invest the $50mn that’s required to get there, if the current business is worth $70mn. That would require the investor, in most circumstances, to take a controlling stake in the overall business. The $50mn investment represents over 70% of the current company value. Few investors want to own that much of a portfolio company, even if they foresee great returns. 

There are all kinds of proven and effective ways to raise larger sums, two of the most common are using a mix of debt and equity, or staging the investment in tranches. The starting place for any business seeking equity finance is to ask “how much money can we best raise now?” rather than “how much money do we want to achieve most quickly our business goals?” The answer to the first determines not only which businesses opportunities a company can pursue, but at what scale. 

Capital – its cost and availability — is often among the last considerations for an entrepreneur. Part of our role as merchant bankers is to bring the entrepreneur’s plans down to earth, to keep those plans and the ability to finance them in harmony. The appropriate-sized tool for the appropriate-sized task. This idea is beautifully expressed by this ancient carved image of Chinese rice threshing machinery. 

DD Done Right

July 30th, 2008 No comments

Due diligence is rarely anyone’s idea of fun and games. Nor should it be. And yet, several days into the process now I’m struck just how positive the process can be, when it’s done right, done well, done in an atmosphere of shared goals and shared respect. At its best, DD sets the tone for a long period of successful partnership and value-creation between a company and an investor. 

This week, DD kicked off between one of our China First Capital clients and the Private Equity firm intending to invest in the company’s first round of equity finance. The PE firm is among the best, and it operates with the precision of a Geneva watchmaker. The DD checklists sent in advance were exhaustive, prepared both in Chinese and English, encompassing legal, financial and managerial topics. 

Our client – after recovering from the initial shock on seeing the sheer volume of information to be collected and presented – dug in and worked until late each night over the weekend to get the material ready.  The laoban struck exactly the right note from the beginning, explaining to his sometimes-beleaguered staff, that the volume of DD material was conclusive proof that this PE firm would make a professional, highly-competent and valuable partner if the deal closes. 

In other words, it’s a step in a process of increased transparency, meticulousness and accuracy. This will benefit the company immediately, in its operations and planning, and ultimately put it in a far stronger position as it moves toward a successful public listing down the road.   

We insist to our clients that they embrace this approach:  “even as a private company, you should adopt the standards of a public one.” This makes the transition to a publicly-traded company, accountable to both to regulators and shareholders, infinitely smoother.  It’s also just good business. 

On Monday, the PE firm’s DD team arrived at our client’s office, and set right to work. The highest standards clearly pervade all aspects of the PE firm’s operation, from the team — led by a woman of uncommon intelligence, poise and grace –  to the lawyers and Big Four accountants chosen to assist. 

They set the right mood from the outset: one of professional collaboration and partnership, rather than of abrasive investigation. In two days of highly-focused scrutiny, with lawyers, accountants and the PE firm’s team working on parallel tracks, the investor got an enormous amount of its preliminary due diligence completed. On Day Three, they headed out to visit the client’s factory in a neighboring province. 

It’s an old truism of PE and VC investing that the one certainty of the DD process is that there will be surprises, generally of an unwelcome variety. The real question is how large are the surprises and how well they are addressed, by both PE firm and the target company. 

I have confidence that in this case, the DD process will continue in a spirit of shared purpose and reciprocal transparency. As a result, I foresee a great outcome for both our client and this PE investor. 

The Term Sheet Goes Global

July 12th, 2008 No comments

Time zones, languages, continents and business models may change as you cross the Pacific, but the Private Equity Term Sheet remains the same.

This is my conclusion after seeing the first Term Sheets arrive for our China First Capital clients recently. This is a happy moment – not so much for ourselves, of course, but for the entrepreneurs and PE firms we are fortunate to work with. For me, seeing these first Term Sheets is cause for reflection and, I hope,  some insight, on the constant truths of the equity investment process. 

I’ve been involved in quite a few Term Sheets for US venture deals over the years. I was surprised to find the Term Sheets this week very familiar, even though the investor and the target company are both based in China. In every other respect except the Term Sheet, the circumstances couldn’t be more different than a typical US venture deal — the governing law,  the industry, the company’s ownership, the likely timing and nature of the exit. 

So, why, despite all these vast differences, are there such deep similarities in Term Sheets? Start with the fact that there’s commonality in the approach of all good institutional investors: they all must exercise fiduciary responsibility on behalf of those whose money they are investing. This, in turn,  means the due diligence process needs to be thorough and professional, and the terms under which investments are made be sufficiently protective of the source of the invested capital. 

This fiduciary duty is made concrete in many of the standard provisions of a Term Sheet, whether that Term Sheet originates in Palo Alto or Shanghai. Indeed, the majority of the text in a Term Sheet is there to protect the fund’s Limited Partners from bad outcomes: share structure (preferred), board seats, liquidation preferences, anti-dilution provisions, preemptive rights, matters requiring special approval, performance guarantees. 

So far so familiar. 

The other big element of any Term Sheet, of course, is where the PE or VC firm is asserting primarily its own interests. The two most obvious areas: expiration dates and “no shop clauses”.  I was mildly surprised to see these in the Term Sheets recently submitted to clients of China First Capital. I’d mistakenly thought the “no shop clause”, in particular,  expressed a very local, American legalistic reality. In business negotiations, Americans need to specify as much as possible in writing, to protect against the ultimate evil of American business life: business litigation. 

Chinese, though, seem to have a far less obsessive need to document everything in writing, and certainly don’t have the same persistent, gnawing fear of litigation. It’s a “guanxi” society, where trust between individuals forms a more insoluble bond than any contractual term. 

A part of me, therefore, wishes the “no shop” clause hadn’t crossed the Pacific. I view them as the Pre Nuptial Agreement of the PE and VC investing world. They can create an air of mutual distrust, at a time when both sides are trying very hard to build a lasting partnership. 

A Term Sheet should serve the same fundamental goal: to allow great PE investors to put capital to work in truly outstanding investment opportunities, while limiting risk for the owners of that capital. I’m excited that the Term Sheets I’ve reviewed this week, once finalized,  will achieve this goal, and achieve phenomenal outcomes for everyone involved.